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1 Introduction
Starting in the mid-1990s, as data became available, there has been a boom of empirical studies
examining the role played by rms in international trade. The rst empirical contributions allowed
gaining valuable microeconomic insights by analyzing rm-level exports and their determinants (e.g.,
Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Clerides et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999). These contributions
inspired theoretical models with heterogeneous rms in open economies (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Bernard
et al., 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) instead of the representative rm models standard in the
international trade literature.1
While this line of research has substantially broadened and deepened in recent years, most existing
analyses are still based on one-sided data, i.e., data that identify what rms are either shipping or
receiving the goods, but do not simultaneously identify the sender and the receiver.2 Hence, while
precious in several dimensions, they do not provide a complete picture of trade relationships as these
are actually two-sided. Evidence on how countriesbilateral trade is made up of varying patterns of
rm-to-rm transactions across goods and country-pairs is still missing. More precisely, there is still
little evidence on the number of actual partners for trading companies across products and countries
as well as on the distribution of rm-level trade across partners.
This paper explores these additional extensive and intensive margins of exports, both empirically
and theoretically. On the empirical side, for the rst time to our knowledge, we use highly disaggre-
gated rm-level exports from three countries, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay to all destination
countries for a number of years, 2005-2008, to provide a detailed description of rmsexport margins,
across products, destination countries, and, crucially, their trading partners. Our ndings reveal the
presence of additional margins of adjustment whereby market conditions also a¤ect the number of
buyers as well as the distribution of export sales (and prices) across buyers in a way that resembles
the adjustment across products as evidence by Mayer et al. (2011).
These ndings can be summarized as follows. First, most exporters serve few foreign buyers,
whereas few exporters serve several foreign buyers. The few exporters that sell several products to
several destinations and, in addition, to several buyers account for a large share of aggregate exports.
Second, reaching a larger number of buyers is an important channel of export expansion, at the country
level as well as at the rm level, both across destinations and within destinations over time. This buyer
extensive margin is at least as important as the rm and the product extensive margins for aggregate
bilateral exports as well as the rmsproduct extensive margin for rmsdestination-specic exports.
Third, the buyer extensive margin responds positively to the market size of the export destination
and negatively to its distance. The buyer intensive margin behaves in a similar way. Changes along
this margin are primarily driven by changes in average quantities. This holds for both exports at the
rm-destination level and for exports at the rm-product-destination level. Fourth, the distribution
of rm-product-destination sales across buyers is skewed. Its skewness decreases with distance to the
destination market while it increases with the size of this market and the intensity of competition
therein. Fifth, in the same destination di¤erent buyers pay di¤erent prices for the same product sold
by the same rm, that is, there is price dispersion at the rm-product-destination level. The price
1See Melitz and Redding (2013a) for a recent survey.
2This literature has provided new evidence on the patterns and determinants of rm-level exports across products
and destination markets (for a recent survey with detailed references, see Bernard et al., 2012). At the same time,
based on samples of manufacturing rms, some researchers have started to look into the patterns and determinants of
intra-rm trade by discretely distinguishing rmsimports between those originated from related companies and those
originated from independent parties (e.g., Bernard et al., 2008; Corcos et al., 2009) as well as into the role of trade
intermediaries (Bernard et al., 2011; Blum et al., 2010 and 2012).
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paid by a buyer depends on its share in the rmstotal exports of the product: the main buyers tend
to pay lower prices. Price dispersion across buyers is more pronounced for di¤erentiated products. It
decreases with distance to the destination market and increases with the size of the latter as well as
with the intensity of competition therein.
On the theoretical side, the paper explores the implications of these ndings asking whether ad-
justment along the buyer margins can be expected to congure an additional channel of welfare gains
associated with international trade. To this end, we rationalize our empirical ndings in terms of a
simple model of selection with heterogeneous buyers and sellers merging the representative consumer
approachto product di¤erentiation (Chamberlin, 1933; Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) with
the address (or characteristics) approach(Hotelling, 1929; Lancaster, 1966 and 1979). Whereas the
former is the current standard in international trade theory, the latter is more popular in industrial
organization, with very few applications to international trade since early works by Lancaster (1980)
and Helpman (1981).3
In line with the address approach as presented by Anderson et al. (1991), we introduce taste
heterogeneity by assuming that the variants of a product can be described as points in a characteristics
space. Consumer preferences are dened over all potential variants, and each consumer has an ideal
variant (address) in the characteristics space. Aggregate preferences for within-product diversity arise
from the dispersion of ideal points (segments) over the characteristics space and, for a given price
vector, a variants demand is dened by the mass of consumers preferring that variant over the others.
In particular, for each di¤erentiated product there is a measure of ideal variants that, in the wake of
Salop (1979), are located around a circle and consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed along
the circle. However, unlike Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) but similar to Capozza and Van Order
(1978), a consumer can buy a variable amount of her ideal variant of each di¤erentiated product as
long as this is available in her market segment. Following the representative consumer approach, the
consumer loves product variety and therefore demands each di¤erentiated product provided her ideal
variant of the product is available.4 However, we depart from the CES demand system usually featured
by international trade models with monopolistic competition and assume instead linear demand as
initially proposed by Ottaviano et al. (2002). This departure is crucial to explain the behavior of the
skewness of sales and the dispersion of prices across buyers of the same product from the same rm
in the same destination market.
Turning to production, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Mayer et al. (2011), rms choose in
which country to locate and in which core segmentto position themselves prior to entry. Upon entry
they draw their total factor productivity in serving their core customers in their domestic market
(core competency). After drawing, they may also decide to serve non-core customers or foreign
markets but in both cases they face additional costs of adaptation or export. In this setting market
size has both a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect through the intensity of competition on: the number
and market shares of active rms as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008); the number of variants of their
products and the distribution of sales across these variants as in Mayer et al (2011); and, critically,
the numbers of their customers and the distribution of sales across them. The last is the crucial novel
3See, e.g., Casella and Rauch (2002), Rauch and Casella (2003) and Rauch and Trindade (2003).
4Helpman (1981) adopts a pureadress model. There is only one di¤erentiated product and the fact that a consumer
has her own ideal variant of that product rules out love for varietyacross variants. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse
(1991) determine the formal conditions under which address (and discrete choice) models can give rise to aggregate
love for varietyacross variants of the same product when individual preferences for ideal variants are aggregated at the
product level. In this respect, though our demand system violates those conditions, our segmentscould be interpreted
as capturing the idea of an intermediate level of aggregation between the individual consumer and the product market
as in the marketing literature since Smith (1956).
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feature of our model in that larger market size is shown to induce a better match between consumers
ideal variants and rmscore competencies, generating an additional channel through which tougher
competition leads to higher productivity and higher welfare.
To better understand how this welfare e¤ect materializes, it is useful to compare our model with
Helpman (1981). In Helpmans model there is no rm heterogeneity, there is only one di¤erentiated
product and consumers are continuously and uniformly distributed along the circle representing the
characteristics space of that product. Due to increasing returns to scale, rms come in a discrete
number, each supplying its unique variant. Hence, available variants occupy a zero measure subset of
the circle, along which they are distributed at equidistant points. This implies that the probability a
consumer nds a perfect match for her ideal variety is zero and she has to make do with the closest
available variant, su¤ering a utility loss that increases with the distance of that variant from her ideal
variant. However, as in a larger market there are more rms, the (symmetric) reciprocal distances
between available variants are shorter and, thus, the average distance between a consumers ideal
variant and the closest available variant is shorter too. This reduces the average mismatch and the
associated utility loss. Moreover, due to increasing returns, the larger market also o¤ers lower prices
for available variants. On both counts, average utility is higher in a larger market.5
Di¤erently, in our model a consumer consumes several di¤erentiated products, has an ideal variant
of each di¤erentiated product and does not consume any other variant (i.e. the utility loss associated
with the consumption of any non-ideal is prohibitive). On the production side, rms are heterogeneous
and each of them has its own core variant of the product(s) it supplies. This core variant corresponds
to the ideal variant of some consumers and can also be transformed in the ideal variants of other
consumers by paying an additional adaptation cost that increases with the distance between the
rms core variant and those other consumersideal variants. As the market gets larger, more rms
enter and produce. The resulting tougher competition forces producers to focus on their core variants.
Consumers whose ideal variants were initially further away from the rmscore variants are not served
anymore and the corresponding products disappear from their consumption baskets. This welfare loss
in terms of product variety is, however, compensated by new products supplied by new rms. Due
to within-product selection, the distance between the core and ideal variants of the new products
is shorter than the distance between the core and ideal variants of disappeared products. Tougher
competition also reduces prices thanks to the compression of markups, the selection of rms, products
as well as variants and the reallocation of expenditure shares towards core variants. For all these
reasons, average utility grows with market size.6
5 In address models the mismatch between buyers and sellers arises from the impossibility for the latter to exactly
cover all the heterogeneous needs of the former due to limited resources. The mechanism is di¤erent in search models
where buyers and sellers cannot instantly nd a good trading partner and have to go through a costly search process
balancing the loss of delaying trade against the option value of trying again and maybe nding a better match. In
search models a larger market can provide higher welfare in the presence of thick market externalities, due for instance
to increasing returns to scale in the matching function. See, for example, Eaton et al., 2013, for a recent search model
applied to importer-exporter relations; Antras and Yeaple, 2013, for a survey stressing the make-or-buy decisions of
multinationals.
6As Helpman (1981) we model the direct interaction between heterogeneous consumers and heterogeneous nal
producers. A similar logic can be extended to the case in which the interaction between heterogeneous consumers and
heterogeneous nal producers is mediated by intermediaries. To see this, consider the model by Helpman (1985) who
extends Helpman (1981) by introducing a di¤erentiated intermediate input (middle product) used to produced the
di¤erentiated nal product. Just like the characteristics space of the nal product, also that of the middle product
is represented by a circle. Moreover, each variant of the nal product has a corresponding best variant of the middle
product: when this variant is used, the required quantities of other factors are lowest. Accordingly, the variants of the
middle product can be represented by the same circle used to represent the variants of the nal product. On the other
hand, when a non-ideal variant is used, the required quantities of other factors increase, the more so the longer the
4
Our paper contributes to an emerging literature that has started to examine the extensive and
intensive margins of exports along the buyer dimension. Modelling marketing costs and distinguish-
ing the cost needed to reach the rst customer from the one needed to reach additional customers,
Arkolakis (2010) exploits the US-Mexico NAFTA liberalization episode in the Nineties to argue that
exports growth materialized through increases not only in the number of exporters (new rm margin)
but also and more importantly through the number of their customers (new consumer margin). In
so doing, he uses disaggregated product data as buyer information was not available.7 Blum et al.
(2010 and 2012) and Eaton et al. (2013) do make use of data that identify the buyers, but for di¤erent
purposes and, unlike our data, these are limited to few pairs of countries. In particular, Blum et al.
(2010 and 2012) use data on Chilean exporters and matched Colombian importers to motivate their
model of trade intermediaries. Eaton et al. (2013) use customs data on the relationships Colombian
rms have with their US buyers to quantify several types of trade costs and learning e¤ects and to
explore their impacts on aggregate export dynamics. Closer to our paper, in a parallel work, Bernard
et al. (2013) use export information from Norway to study the impact of foreign buyerssize hetero-
geneity on aggregate trade elasticity.8 However, di¤erently from ours, their analysis does not deepen
the investigation of the rm-product level and does not cover the distributions of sales nor prices
across buyers.
Our paper also relates to the ongoing debate on the gains from trade with heterogeneous agents
(see, e.g., Arkolakis et al., 2012a,b; Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2013; Melitz and Redding, 2013b).
This debate has so far focused on models in which sellers are heterogeneous but buyers are not. We
introduce heterogeneous buyers and highlight the gains arising from the interaction between sellers
and buyersheterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 describes our data and presents
our empirical ndings. Section 3 presents the closed economy version of the theoretical model with
single-product rms. Section 4 extends the single-product model to the open economy. Section 5
introduces multi-product rms. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 BuyersMargins of Exports
We use three unique databases consisting of highly disaggregated annual rmsexport data from three
countries, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay, over the period 2005-2008. In particular, these customs
distance between the ideal variant and the non-ideal variant actually used. Increasing returns to scale in intermediates
imply that only a discrete number of variants of the middle product is available, many variants of the nal product are
produced with the same variant of the middle product and only a zero measure set of nal products actually uses ideal
variants of the middle product. In a larger market there are more intermediate producers, the (symmetric) reciprocal
distances between the available variants of the middle product are shorter and, thus, the average distance between a
nal producers ideal variant and the closest available variant is shorter too. This reduces the average mismatch and
the associated productivity loss. Moreover, due to increasing returns, the larger market also o¤ers lower prices for the
available variants of the middle product. This extended framework highlights another reason why welfare is higher in
a larger market: intermediate and nal producers are better matched.
7 In Arkolakis (2010) consumers with identical tastes may end up consuming di¤erent CES bundles of di¤erentiated
products due to imperfect marketing penetration. In particular, a consumer buys a good only if she is aware of its
existence, and becomes aware of its existence only if she observes a costly ad posted by its producer. The producer
serves the market only if it is protable to incur the marginal cost to reach at least one consumer and then incurs an
increasing marginal penetration cost to access additional consumers. Assuming that the marketing technology exhibits
increasing returns to scale with respect to population size but decreasing returns to scale with respect to the number
of consumers reached, the model is used to reconcile the positive relationship between entry and market size with the
existence of many small producers.
8Some of our ndings concur with those reported by Bernard et al. (2013) for Norwegian exporters.
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data are reported at the exporter-product-country-importer level. Hence, we know exactly the value
and the quantity (weight) of the shipment of each exporter of each product (10-digit HS level) to each
importing company in each destination country, which is the level at which trade actually takes place.
Hence, we are able to track not only exporters but also importers over time.
These data virtually cover the whole population of exporting rms in the sample countries and not
just a sample of manufacturing rms. In the case of Costa Rica, the sum of the exports of the rms in
our database amounts on average to approximately 90% of the countrys total merchandise exports as
reported by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, with the di¤erence being explained by exports of Gold
Co¤ee, which due to administrative reasons are registered separately, and by the absence of data on
the importers identity for a few exporters. As for Ecuador, only a minor portion of oil exports is
not included. Regarding Uruguay, the discrepancy of our data with the Central Bank reports never
exceeds 1% over the period under analysis.
2.1 Countries
Table 1 presents aggregate export indicators for the three countries over the sample period. The
number of exporters in these countries ranges between 2,000 in the case of Uruguay and 4,000 in
the case of Ecuador. These exporting rms sell 3,000 (Uruguay and Ecuador) to 4,000 (Costa Rica)
products to more than 11,000 buyers spread approximately across 150 destinations. Hence, these
three countries are fairly similar in terms of their aggregate export outcomes.
Bernard et al. (2007), Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) as well as Mayer et al. (2011) use gravity
regressions to decompose the behavior of aggregate bilateral trade ows along the number of exporters
(rm extensive margin), the number of exported products (product extensive margin), and average
exports per exporter and product (rm/product intensive margin). The rm and product extensive
margins are found to be positively a¤ected by the size of the destination markets (as proxied by the
GDP) and negatively a¤ected by the distance to these markets, whereas the opposite holds for the
rm/product intensive margin.
In Table 2 we decompose total bilateral exports along the aforementioned extensive margins and, as
a novelty, the number of buyers (buyer extensive margin) and average exports per exporter-product-
buyer combinations that actually register trade (rm/product/buyer intensive margin) for both 2005
and the entire sample period (2005-2008), whereas in Table 3 we examine how these margins respond
to various export market characteristics, respectively.9
Our decompositions suggest that the extensive margins account together for more than 50% (and
up to two thirds in the case of Uruguay) of the variation of the exports across destinations (see Table
2, left panel). It is worth noting that the buyer extensive margin is slightly more important than the
rm and the product extensive margins for bilateral exports and that this applies to our three sample
countries. In particular, the buyer extensive margin is responsible for 35% of the overall extensive
marginshare and this is remarkably consistent across these countries.
In addition, the extensive margins jointly account for approximately 20% of the expansion of the
within-destination sales (see Table 2, right panel).10 However, there are noticeable di¤erences across
countries in this regard, as this share ranges between 15% in the case of Ecuador and 30% in the case
of Uruguay. Also remarkable, with the exception of Costa Rica, increases in the number of buyers
9Figures do not add up to one along the rows because we are reporting the contribution of the actual intensive margin,
which considers the exporter-product-buyer triples with positive trade, instead of that of the theoretical intensive margin,
which considers all their possible combinations.
10The joint contribution of the extensive margins is the complement of that of the actual intensive margin.
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seem to be as important as and even more important than increases in the number of exporters
and products as a driving force for export expansions in given destinations. The share of the buyer
extensive margin in the overall contribution of the extensive margins to these expansions lies between
30% and 40%.
Estimates of the gravity equations indicate that the buyer extensive margin behaves much like the
other traditional extensive margins: it decreases with the distance to and increases with the size and
the per capita income of the destination markets (see Table 3, left and right panels).11 The actual
intensive margin, which in this case incorporates the buyer dimension, reacts qualitatively in the same
way to distance and market size, albeit it appears to be less responsive.12 Moreover, it does not seem
to be systematically related to the destinations income per capita. GDP-related results are illustrated
in Figure 1.13
2.2 Firms
Table 4 describes the distribution of export outcomes across rms in the three sample countries. For
parsimony, we focus on 2005 but similar patterns emerge for all years in the sample. The median
(average) Costa Rican exporter sells 2 (5.9) products to 2 (6.9) buyers in 2 (2.9) countries for USD
35,000. The median (average) Ecuadorian exporter sells 1 (3.2) products to 1 (4.9) buyers in 1 (2.3)
countries for USD 28,000; numbers for the median (average) Uruguayan exporter are very similar. Im-
portantly, columns reporting other percentiles of the distributions of export outcomes clearly suggest
that, while most exporters trade with a limited number of foreign buyers, a few rms have broadly
diversied trade relationships in terms of the range of buyers they are connected with. Thus, half of
the exporters have no more than two buyers, but the top 10% (5%) interact with more than 11 (20)
buyers. Such heterogeneity can be visualized with the help of the upper left panel of Figure 2, which
presents the cumulative distribution of exporters over the number of trading partners.
Consistently, as shown by the cumulative distribution of exporters over the share of the main
buyer in the upper right panel of Figure 2, this main buyer accounts for a large portion or directly
all foreign sales of a relatively large number of exporting rms. In contrast, a few rms have their
sales spread across many buyers. For the top 10% (5%) exporters in terms of the number of buyers,
the average share of the main buyer does not exceed 40% (38%) and is as low as 32% (25%) in the
case of Uruguay. The kernel densities estimates in the lower panel of Figure 2 highlight that, as
expected, these patterns become more pronounced as the level of disaggregation of the data goes from
the rm-level to the rm-product-destination-level. While Figure 2 pools our three countries, similar
ndings hold for each of them.14
Disaggregated data specically indicate that most exporters sell abroad only a few products to a
few buyers in a few destinations. The other side of the coin is that the few rms that export several
products to several destinations and, on top, to several buyers account for large shares of total exports.
Noteworthy, this is also true relative to rms that also sell several products in several destinations
but only to a few buyers. This can be seen in Figure 3, which reports the fraction of exporters that
11GDP is PPP expressed in a common currency and constant prices and comes from the World Banks World
Development Indicators (WDI). The same applies to GDP per capita. Distances, common language, and colony come
from the CEPII database. The source for the RTA variable is CEPII and WTO.
12Consistent with previous ndings, the theoretical intensive margin is positively associated with distance and nega-
tively associated with market size and income level. These results are available from the authors upon request.
13An appendix with results from gravity estimations by country of origin and at di¤erent levels of aggregation (i.e.,
country, rm-destination, and rm-product-destination) is available from the authors upon request.
14See Figure A1 in the Appendix.
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have no less than n buyers in at least one of their m destinations and no less than s buyers of at least
one their r (di¤erentiated) products (left panel) and the share of aggregate exports due to exporters
that have no less than n buyers in at least one of their m destinations and no less than s buyers of
at least one their r (di¤erentiated) products (right panel).15 This concentration of aggregate exports
in the hands of few large rms that sell several products to several markets concurs with the happy
fewndings of Bernard at al. (2007) for the US and Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for the EU. Our
data additionally reveal that an analogous pattern applies to the number of buyers: rms with a large
pool of customers are a very selective sample of the population, and these rms represent a large
fraction of the total exports.
2.3 Firms and Destinations
As with aggregate bilateral exports, we now decompose rm-destination exports into their various
margins and examine how exports and margins relate to the destinations characteristics. Table 5
reports the results of the decomposition of rm-destination exports into the number of products
(rms product extensive margin), the number of buyers (rms buyer extensive margin), and
average exports per product-buyer combinations with positive trade (rmsproduct/buyer intensive
margin).16 The table shows that the extensive margin accounts for roughly 17% of the variation
rmsexports both across countries in a given year (see left panel) and 23% of the variation of rms
exports within given countries over time (see right panel). Nevertheless, behind this aggregate picture
there are signicant di¤erences across sample countries. Thus, for instance, the share of the extensive
margin in the variation of rm-destination exports in a given year is only 10% in Ecuador but more
than 20% in Uruguay, whereas that over time reaches 21% in Ecuador and Costa Rica and almost
30% in Uruguay. Still, the buyer extensive margin is comparable to the product extensive margin in
terms of its contribution to explain the variation of rmsexports both across and within countries.
Gravity equation estimates indicate that the buyer extensive margin reacts to trade enhancers
and barriers like its product analogue: it tends to be positively associated with the market size of the
destinations and tends to be negatively associated with the distance to these destinations. Specically,
the number of buyers seems to have a more pronounced response to market size than the number of
products. Interestingly, the buyer/product intensive margin behaves in a similar manner (see Table
6). The same applies to the average exports per buyer.17
Mayer at al. (2011) show that exporterssales are not uniformly distributed across its product
mix but rather skewed towards some core products, and that this skewness is more pronounced in
more accessible and bigger markets. In Table 6 we also assess the behavior of the distribution of rm-
destination sales across buyers. In so doing, we proxy the skewness of sales across buyers by the share
of the main buyer (SMB) and add the number of buyers in the destination in question to control for
any mechanical e¤ect of this variable on our skewness indicator when the number of buyers is small.
Our estimates suggest that concentration of sales - conditional on the number of buyers - reacts to
distance and market size in the same way as the skewness of the product mix - conditional on the
number of products - being higher in closer and larger markets.18 Figure 4 provides a visualization of
15 In distinguishing between di¤erentiated and non-di¤erentiated products, we use the liberal version of the classica-
tion developed by Rauch (1999).
16Again, gures do not add up to one along the rows because we are reporting the contribution of the actual intensive
margin instead of the theoretical intensive margin, which would use as a denominator all possible combinations of
products and buyers.
17This result is available from the authors upon request.
18As we will see below, this nding is robust to using alternative measures of salesconcentration.
8
the GDP-related gravity-based results.
2.4 Firms, Products, and Destinations
2.4.1 Margins
Turning to rm-product level data, we replicate the previous analysis, this time decomposing rm-
product-destination exports into the number of buyers (rms-productsbuyer extensive margin) and
average exports per buyer (rms-productsbuyer intensive margin), which in turn can be decomposed
into average unit values and average export quantities (weight) per buyer. The results reported in
Table 7 suggest that, also within this more narrowly dened level, the buyer margin plays a relevant
role and accounts for up to 10% of the variation of rm-product exports across destinations (left panel)
and for up to 17% of the variation of exports within given rm-product-destinations over time (right
panel). Average quantity per buyer and, to a lesser extent, average unit values also contribute to
explain such exports. Again, there are di¤erences among our sample countries. The buyer extensive
margin seems to be relatively more important in Uruguay than in Costa Rica and Ecuador. On
the other hand, increases in average unit values appear as a substantive driving force of the export
expansion of Costa Rican rms in given product-destinations.
In Table 8 we examine how rm-product-destination exports and their di¤erent margins respond to
market characteristics. Consistent with results shown above, rmsexports by product and destination
country decrease with distance to this country and increase with its economic size. Both the number
of buyers and average exports per buyer behave in the same way, with the latter being more elastic
with respect to trade determinants. Furthermore, most of the changes in the buyer intensive margin
can be traced back to changes in average quantities per buyer. Unit values are primarily inuenced by
the level of income of the destination market. This in line with ndings reported in recent empirical
studies on quality di¤erences across space, according to which rms tend to ship higher-priced varieties
to more developed countries (e.g., Hummels and Klenow, 2004 and 2005; Hallak, 2006; Manova and
Zhang, 2012). Previous results remain robust to including country-random year e¤ects to account
for within country-correlation (Wooldridge, 2006); and, when applicable, to using a Poisson estimator
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) or Tobit-based corrections for sample selection (Wooldridge, 2002)
to account for the presence of zeroes.19
2.4.2 Sales Distribution and Price Dispersion across Buyers
Our data also make it possible to explore the distribution of sales and price dispersion across buyers at
the rm-product-destination level and how these are inuenced by the destinationsattributes. This
is done in Figures 5 and 6 and Tables 9 to 11. In particular, Figure 5 presents the distribution of the
share of the main buyer and the standard deviation of prices across buyers for both di¤erentiated and
non-di¤erentiated products. While there is no distinguishing pattern in terms of how sales are spread
across buyers, as expected, prices of di¤erentiated goods are clearly more heterogeneous than those
of non-di¤erentiated goods.20 Interestingly, within given exporting rm-product-destination(-year)
combinations, the main buyer seems to systematically pay lower prices than other buyers.21 In Table
19These estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
20The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test-based procedure proposed by Delgado et al. (2002) indicates that the distribution
of the price dispersion of di¤erentiated goods stochastically dominates that of the price dispersion of non-di¤erentiated
goods. Test statistics are available from the authors upon request.
21We specically regress the natural logarithm of the unit value paid by a buyer of a given product in a given country
from a given exporter on a binary indicator that takes the value of one if the buyer is the most important - in terms
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9 we report the e¤ects of distance, market size, and income per capita on the share of the main buyer
(SMB).22 We also present the impact on the same outcome variable of the toughness of competition as
proxied by the number of other rms from the three sample countries exporting the same HS2-product
to the same destination as the exporter in question (Mayer et al., 2011), the size of its market, and the
degree of freeness of trade in this destination as measured by a country-HS2-level indicator computed
from gravity equation estimates (Mayer et al. 2011). In both cases, we consider all products (left
panel) and only di¤erentiated products (right panel), while including rm-product-year xed e¤ects
to account for rm-product factors that vary over time such as rms productivity and changing
rmscompetencies across products, and the number of buyers to control for any mechanical e¤ect on
skewness. Estimates indicate that the distribution of sales across buyers - conditional on the number
of buyers - is more skewed in closer and larger markets (see also Figure 6). Hence, the concentration
of sales across buyers exhibits the same behavior observed at the rm-destination level. Moreover,
results clearly suggest that the concentration of sales in the main buyer increases with the intensity of
the competition prevailing in the destination. The same holds for the destinations freeness of trade.
Table 10 shows that similar responses are found when using alternative concentration measures
such as the sales ratio of the most important buyer to the least important buyer (B1/BL) and indicators
that use information on the entire distribution of sales across buyers such as the Herndahl index (HI),
the Theil index (TI), and the coe¢ cient of variation (CV), thus corroborating the baseline estimates.23
Results convey the same message when using quantities (weight) instead of values to compute sales
concentration measures; when restricting the sample to rm-product-destinations observations with
at least two buyers (i.e., those used in estimations in which the dependent variable is the sales
ratio); when excluding ows associated with trade between (vertically) related companies, and on both
capital and intermediate goods and consumer goods.24 Also important, these results remain robust to
including country-year random e¤ects to control for within country-correlation (Wooldridge, 2006).25
Finally, in Table 11 we investigate how market characteristics a¤ect price dispersion at the rm-
product-destination level. The price dispersion indicators are: the di¤erence between the maximum
and the minimum prices (PM-Pm), the coe¢ cient of variation (CV), and the standard deviation (SD).
The covariates are those used in previous estimations. According to the estimates presented in this
table, price dispersion is larger in closer and bigger destination markets (see also Figure 6). In addition,
the results indicate that dispersion at this level tends to increase with stronger competition. It also
seems to rise with the freeness of trade in the destination. Again, these results are robust to several
checks such as removing observations in which (vertically) related rms are involved; and incorporating
country-year random e¤ects to control for within country-correlation (Woorldridge, 2006).26 Hence,
a more skewed buyer mix comes with higher price dispersion.
of its share in the total quantity (weight) sold by the exporter in that product-destination combination - as well as on
exporting rm-product-destination-year xed e¤ects. A table with estimation results and test statistics are available
from the authors upon request.
22Results reported in Table 9 are based on estimations in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
the share of the main buyer. Estimates are qualitatively similar when using, instead, directly the share of the main
buyer as the dependent variable. These estimates are available from the authors upon request.
23 In the estimations whose results are presented in Table 10 the dependent variables (Herndahl index, Theil index,
and coe¢ cient of variation) are expressed in natural logarithms. Results are comparable when we do not take logarithms.
These results are available from the authors upon request.
24We use the WorldBase to identify rms that are vertically related (Alfaro and Chen, 2012).
25These estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
26These estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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2.5 Summary
Our data analysis has revealed the importance of the buyer margins for aggregate exports and has
shed light on their composition. Most rms export only few products to few buyers in few destinations.
The ip side of the coin is that the few exporters that sell multiple products to multiple destinations
and, on top, to multiple buyers are responsible for large shares of total exports. This is also true
relative to rms that also sell several products in several destinations but only to a few buyers.
When investigating whether and how the buyer margins are shaped by the characteristics of
destinations, we have found that a rms (rm-products) number of buyers and the distribution of
sales across them systematically vary with destination characteristics. In particular, the number of
buyers and the average exports per buyer increase with the size and the accessibility of the destination
country. Conditional on the number of buyers, the same holds for the concentration of rm (rm-
product) sales across them.
Finally, we have drawn attention to the behavior of prices, in particular of their dispersion: even
within a specic destination di¤erent buyers pay di¤erent prices to the same rm for the same product,
and these price di¤erences are sizable for di¤erentiated products. In particular, buyers that account for
larger shares of a rms sales of a given product pay lower prices for that product. We have also shown
how price dispersion is a¤ected by country characteristics, being more pronounced in destinations that
are bigger and more accessible.
In the next sections we propose a model that generates predictions consistent with our empirical
ndings and use it to show that adjustments along the buyer margins can be expected to congure
an additional channel of gains from trade.
3 Single-Product Model in Closed Economy
As discussed by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1991), there are three main approaches to modeling
product di¤erentiation: the representative consumer approach (Chamberlin, 1933; Spence, 1976; Dixit
and Stiglitz, 1977), the address (or characteristics) approach (Hotelling, 1929; Lancaster, 1966 and
1977) and the discrete choice approach (McFadden, 1974; Manski, 1977). This section combines the
rst two approaches to develop a simple model of selection with heterogeneous consumers and rms.
In the proposed model the intensity of competition a¤ects the number and market shares of active
rms as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the number of variants of their products and the distribution
of sales across these variants as in Mayer et al. (2011) as well as the numbers of their customers and
the distribution of sales across them.
This is the key original aspect of the proposed model in that tougher competition in a larger market
induces a better match between consumers ideal variants and rmscore competencies, generating
a new channel through which tougher competition leads to higher productivity and higher welfare.
This paves the way to an additional source of gains from trade in the spirit of Helpman (1981).
3.1 Heterogeneous Consumers
There are L consumers with preferences dened over a homogenous good 0 and a set 
 of horizontally
di¤erentiated products indexed i 2 
. Each consumer is endowed with q0 units of the homogeneous
good and one unit of labor that she inelastically supplies to the market. Each di¤erentiated product
comes itself in di¤erent variants and consumers di¤er in terms of their tastes for these variants.
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Following the address approach, taste heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that a products
variants can be described as points in a characteristics space. Consumer preferences are dened over
all potential variants, and each consumer has a most preferred variant known as her ideal point (or
address) in the characteristics space. Aggregate preferences for within-product diversity arise from
the dispersion of ideal points over the characteristics space and, for a given price vector, a variants
demand is dened by the mass of consumers preferring that variant over the others.27 In particular,
for each di¤erentiated product i there is a measure 2 of ideal variants that, in the wake of Salop (1979)
and Helpman (1981), are located around a circle C of circumference 2 and are indexed s 2 [0; 2] in
a clockwise manner starting from noon (see Figure 7). The location of the ideal variant of a given
consumer is assumed to be the same across all products, so each ideal variant s denes a market
segment consisting of the set of consumers whose ideal variant is s for all products. Consumers are
further assumed to be uniformly distributed across the segments. Each segment, therefore, consists
of L=2 consumers. These assumptions assure the symmetry of the address model, simplifying the
ensuing analysis without a¤ecting its main insights.
Di¤erently from Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) but just like Capozza and Van Order (1978),
a consumer can buy a variable amount of her ideal variant of each di¤erentiated product as long as
available in her market segment. In particular, let 
s  
 be the set of products whose variants are

























where  > 0 measures the love for varietyof the di¤erent products while  and  measure the prefer-
ence for the di¤erentiated products with respect to the homogeneous good. The initial endowment q0
of the homogeneous good is assumed to be large enough for its consumption to be strictly positive at
the market equilibrium. According to this preference structure, each market segment is characterized
in terms of a set of identical consumers who like a variety of di¤erentiated products but demand a
specic ideal variant of each of them. When their ideal variant of a product is not available, the
consumers does not demand that product at all.
3.2 Heterogeneous Firms
Labor is the only input. It can be employed in the production of the homogeneous good under perfect
competition and constant returns to scale with unit labor requirement equal to one. It can also be
employed in the production of the di¤erentiated products under monopolistic competition. In each
segment s there is an innite number of potential entrants with entry requiring a R&D e¤ort of f > 0
units of labor to design a new product in that segment together with its production process, which
is also characterized by constant returns to scale. E¤ort f leads to the design of a new product in
segment s with certainty whereas the unit labor requirement c of the corresponding production process






, c 2 [0; cM ] (2)
27As pointed out by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1991), this address model is equivalent to a discrete choice
model with each consumer choosing the variant yielding the highest utility, while the taste distribution can be obtained
from the distribution of ideal points.
12
This corresponds to the case in which marginal productivity 1=c is Pareto distributed with shape
parameter k  1 over the support [1=cM ;1).28 Hence, as k rises, density is skewed towards the upper
bound of the support of G(c).
The R&D e¤ort cannot be recovered and this gives rise to a sunk entry cost. By sinking f in a
given segment, an entrant selects it as its core segment, inventing the corresponding core variant
of its product with corresponding core unit input requirement(or core competency) c. However,
after entry, the entrant can also decide to supply variants of its product to other non-core segments.
This involves additional adaptation that imposes incrementally higher unit labor requirements for the
variants the further away their segments are from the entrants core segment. Specically, if the core
variant introduced in segment s entails a unit labor requirement c, its non-core variant adapted to
segment s0 entails a unit labor requirement ejs s0jc, where js  s0j is the length of shortest arc linking
s and s0 on the circle C (see Figure 7). In this setup, the parameter  > 0 can be interpreted as
an index of taste heterogeneity. When  = 0, all consumers share the same ideal variants of the
di¤erentiated products and no adaptation is thus required as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). As 
grows, consumersideal variants diverge and adaptation becomes increasingly costly.29
3.3 FirmsSelection
On the demand side, utility maximization gives the following individual inverse demand for product
is variant in segment s





qsc(i)di, as long as q
s
c(i) > 0. Total demand in segment s therefore equals











ps; 8i 2 
s (4)
where the set 
s is the largest subset of 

s such that demand is positive, Ns is the measure (number)










(+ Nsps)  psmax (5)
where psmax   represents the price at which demand for a product is driven to zero. Given (3), lower
psmax implies higher price elasticity of demand.
On the supply side, due to perfect competition and the assumed unit labor requirement for the
production of the homogeneous good, choosing this good as numeraire sets also the wage equal to
one. Accordingly, we can refer to unit labor requirement and marginal cost interchangeably as they
coincide. Turning to the monopolistically competitive sector, consider a rm with marginal cost c in its
core segment s that maximizes the prot from selling to segment s0. We assume market segmentation,
28As argued by Mayer et al. (2011), the distributional assumption (2) yields, up to an additive shift, a Pareto
distribution for rm size and product sales that ts empirical patterns well.
29Whereas in our data both sellers and buyers are rms, in our model buyers are consumers. This apparent incon-
sistency that abstracts from intermediaries is customary in international trade theory. In the present setup, it can
be circumvented by assuming that each market segment is populated by perfectly competitive nal producers that
buy segment-specic intermediates from the monopolistically competitive rms and transform them one-to-one into
segment-specic nal products. Such a model with middle productswould be homomorphic to the model we propose
and we prefer to stick to the latter for ease of exposition. See, e.g., Helpman (1985) for a full-edged address model
with middle products.
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so the problem of prot maximization is solved for each segment s0 independently. In particular, a
rm with marginal cost c will sell to segment s0 if and only if c  cs0e js s0j, where cs0 = ps0max is the
threshold below which the marginals costs of any rm with core segment s0 has to fall for the rm
to be able to protably serve its core segment (core cuto¤ cost). The rst order condition for prot



















































This last expression determines a cuto¤ rule for selling to segment s0. In particular, a rm with
marginal cost c will sell to segment s0 if and only if c  cs0e js s0j, where cs0 = ps0max is the threshold
below which the marginals costs of any rm with core segment s0 has to fall for the rm to be able to
protably serve its core segment (core cuto¤ cost). The cuto¤ rule explains the theoretical appeal of
the distributional assumption (2) in that any truncation ofG(c) from above maintains its distributional














0  cs0e js s0jc is the marginal cost of producers
with core segment s that are just indi¤erent between serving segment s0 or not.












which generates a set of free entry conditions, one for each segment. The symmetry of the address
model, however, simplies the analysis a lot. First of all, it implies that the core cuto¤ cost has to be
the same in all segments: cs
0
= cs = cD. Then, as all rms face symmetric conditions whatever their
core segments may be, we can index m 2 [0; 1] the variants of the product sold by a rm in increasing
order of shortest arc distance from its core segment (m = 0). We thus have e js s0j = e m so that











dm = f (12)
















(1  e k)=k 2 (0; 1) is the share of consumers (and, therefore, of segments) successful entrants serve
on average. Accordingly, we call  the average market penetration(Arkolakis, 2010).30 This is af-
fected by the extent of consumer and rm heterogeneity. When  = 0, taste heterogeneity disappears
and  equals 1: all active rms serve each and every consumer as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who
assume homogeneous consumers and, therefore, a single market segment. As  increases,  decreases:
more taste heterogeneity makes market penetration more di¢ cult and rms reduce the share of con-
sumers they serve.31 The same happens when k increases: as rms with high marginal production
costs become more frequent, the average ability to penetrate the market falls.32 Accordingly, more
taste heterogeneity (larger ) is associated with weaker competition and selection (higher cD).





 mk the conditional distribution of rms with core segment at distancem from the segment




























while the number of producers whose core segment is the segment under consideration is NP = N=2
and the associated number of entrants is NE = G(cD)NP = (cD=cM )kNP . Expressions (13) and (14)
fully characterize the equilibrium.
3.4 ConsumersSelection
How many consumers does a rm with core marginal cost c serve? As adaptation costs rise with
distance from the core segment and core cuto¤ costs are the same in all segments, demand in a
segment for the product of a rm whose core segment is at distance m from the segment under
consideration falls when the shortest arc distance m from the core increases. Along the circle there








30 In the terminology of Arkolakis (2010) our parameter  would regulate the marginal cost of market penetration,
which increases with the number of segments reached.
31Even a small degree of taste heterogeneity is enough to prevent some rms (the least productive ones) from serving
all consumers:  < 1 for  > 0.
32The sign @=@ < 0 follows from @

=(1  e k) =@ = 1  (1 + k) e k  1  e k2 > 0 as 1  (1 + k) e k
equals 0 for  = 0 and increases with  for  > 0. An analogous argument can be used to show that also @=@k < 0
holds.
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which implies that there exists some threshold distance mD(c) at which consumers are just indi¤erent
between buying or not, that is: qm(c) = 0 for m = mD(c). This threshold denes the rms cuto¤
segmentwith
mD(c) =








if cDe  < c  cD
0 if c > cD
(16)
As there are two such segments, one on each side of the circle starting from the rms core segment,
the total number of segments served by the rm is 2mD(c). The corresponding number of consumers
served from the core segment up to the two cuto¤ segments is thus mD(c)L while the combined
demand by segments at distance m  mD(c) from the core is given by (15). Accordingly, the lower c
the larger the numbers of segments 2mD(c) and consumers mD(c)L the rm serves, and the larger the
output qm(c) it sells at any given distance from its core segment m  mD(c). This shows that rms
with lower core marginal cost have a wider and thicker market, and only rms whose core marginal
costs is low enough are able to serve all consumers.
3.5 Firm Performance
Expressions (7)-(10) can be rewritten so as to show that at any distance m  mD(c) rms with lower


























This implies that rms with lower c are also larger in terms of both total output Q(c) and total























2    emc2i dm













so that the free entry condition (12) can be equivalently stated asZ cD
0
(c)dG(c) = f (18)
This will come handy when we open up the economy to international trade.
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Finally, rms with lower core marginal cost are more productive in terms of both physical produc-






















2    emc2i dm=PRmD(c)
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This deator is the average of the prices of all the variants of all the products weighted by their
output share. We could also have used the unweighted price average p that we previously dened, or
an average weighted by a variants revenue share (i.e. its market share) instead of output share. In our
model, as in Mayer et al. (2011), all of these price averages only di¤er by a multiplicative constant,
so the e¤ects of competition (i.e., the changes in the cuto¤ cD) on productivity do not depend on this
choice of price averages.
3.6 Aggregate Performance
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dG(c)
give the same result






This reveals that, as  increases from zero, rising cD leads to lower aggregate productivity. Thus, the
fact that consumer heterogeneity relaxes competition and rm selection implies that it also hampers
productivity.
Lastly, due to the symmetry of the address model, in equilibrium all consumer achieve the same
level of utility whatever their ideal variants. Welfare can then be measured in terms of the indirect
utility of any individual consumer and this evaluates to











This is the same function of cD as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). What di¤ers here is the fact that
the cuto¤ cost cD now depends on taste heterogeneity through  as shown by (13). In particular,
more taste heterogeneity (smaller ) reduces welfare as it becomes harder for producers to satisfy the
specic needs of di¤erent consumers with a given amount of resources.
3.7 Market Size, Productivity and Welfare
A hallmark result in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) concerns the impact of market size on aggregate
productivity through rm selection as a larger number of consumers makes competition tougher by
compressing the cuto¤ marginal cost and rmsmarkups. As a consequence, high marginal cost rms
exit and market shares are disproportionately reallocated towards the lowest marginal cost survivors.
Here similar reallocations take place but there is an additional round of adjustment. As survivors
retreat from segments distant from their core ones, they stop serving some customers whose ideal
varieties are too far away from their core segments and reallocate resources disproportionately to-
wards these segments. The result is a better alignment between consumersideal varieties and rms
core competencies, which generates a new channel through which larger market size leads to higher
productivity and higher welfare thanks to lower cD (see (19) and (20)).
In particular, from (13) we see that larger L compresses cD. By (14), lower cD increases the
number of sellers in each segment. This happens despite the associated fall in the total sales of each
producer as entailed by (17) as well as in the number of customers served by each producer and in
the number of producers tapped by each customer as entailed by (16). Note, however, that average
market penetration  is una¤ected. This is explained by the presence of opposing e¤ects that exactly
o¤set each other. Tougher competition shrinks the market penetration of all rms with marginal cost
c in the interval cDe  < c  cD. By itself this e¤ect would reduce average market penetration. At
the same time, however, tougher competition also forces some rms out of the market altogether. As
these are the rms with marginal cost c > cD that already had the smallest market penetration to
start with, by itself their exit would increase average market penetration. It is a specic implication
of the assumed distribution (2) that the two opposing e¤ects exactly elicit each other. We do not
emphasize this exact result, but rather the presence of opposing forces generating the relationship
between market size and average market penetration. No change in the average number of segments a
rm covers then implies that in a larger market rms serve, on average, a larger number of consumers.
This is consistent with the evidence presented in Section 2.
Lower cD also skews the distribution of sales away from higher marginal cost towards lower marginal
cost variants, which implies that: lower marginal cost rms gain market share; among the customers
of a rm, the output and revenue shares of those closer to the core segment increase; among the
producers tapped by a consumer, the consumption and expenditure shares of those closer to her ideal
variety increase. To see how skewness is a¤ected, consider two variants of a rms product at distance
























which are decreasing functions of cD as long as m > m0 and, thus, lower cD enhances the skewness
of sales towards the closer segment to the core. This e¤ect is driven by the fact that falling cD puts
a stronger downward pressure on the markups of low marginal cost variants than on the markups of
high marginal cost variants as the demand elasticity faced by the former rises more than that faced
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Hence, in a larger market all rms with cDe  < c  cD cover fewer segments with a larger fraction of
sales concentrated in their core segment and a wider price dispersion across the segments they serve.
4 Single-Product Model in Open Economy
We now turn to the open economy in order to examine how the characteristics of export destinations
a¤ect the buyer margins of exports. In so doing, we follow Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and consider
an arbitrary number of countries allowing for asymmetric bilateral trade costs. We use J to denote the
number of countries, indexing them by l = 1; :::; J , and call Ll country ls population. All countries
share the same characterization of demand with taste heterogeneity modeled in terms of an address
model in which consumers ideal varieties are located around a circle C of circumference 2 and are
indexed s 2 [0; 2] in a clockwise manner starting from noon (see, again, Figure 7). Consumers are
assumed to be uniformly distributed across segments so that in country l each segment consists of
Ll=2 consumers. Within-segment preferences are again given by (1).
As for technology, we maintain the same assumptions as in the closed economy. Firms choose a
production location and a segment before entering and paying the sunk entry cost f . We assume that
the entry cost f and the cost distribution (2) are common across countries.33 We further assume that
the homogeneous good is freely traded and choose it as our numeraire good. This implies that the
wage equals one in all countries. International trade in di¤erentiated products is, instead, hampered
by iceberg costs and the national markets of these products are assumed to be segmented. Any variant
produced for segment s in country l can be exported to the same segment s in country h subject to an
iceberg trade cost  lh > 1. Local delivery is, instead, free:  ll = 1. As segments are symmetric, from
the viewpoint of a rm what matters for its delivered cost is their shortest arc distance m from its
core segment m = 0. Hence, for a rm with core marginal cost c producing in country l and delivering
to country h, the marginal delivered cost to a segment located at distance m from its core segment
equals  lhemc.
4.1 Buyersand SellersSelection
Exploiting again segmentssymmetry, let pl denote the price threshold for positive demand in any




(+ Nlpl) ; (21)
where Nl is the total number of variants (and thus rms) selling in each segment of country l and pl is
their average price. Given that a rm with core marginal cost c producing in country l and delivering
to country h has two symmetric segments at distance m both in the domestic and the export markets,
33These assumptions can be relaxed as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
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chh    lhemc
2 (22)
where cll = pl and clh = ph= lh are the marginal cost cuto¤s for positive domestic and export sales:
a rm with core cost c will produce all variants m such that mll (c)  0 and export to h the subset
of variants m such that mlh (c)  0. Accordingly, the total numbers of variants produced (mll(c)) and
exported (mlh(c)) by the rm are determined by the rms domestic and export cuto¤ segments
mll(c) =








for clle  < c  cll
0 for c > cll
(23)
mlh(c) =
8<: 1 for c  clhe







for chhe = lh < c  chh= lh
0 for c > chh= lh
where we have used the fact that chh = ph and clh = ph= lh imply clh = chh= lh. In each market
there are two cuto¤ segments, one on each side of the circle starting from the rms core segment. The
corresponding numbers of consumers served are mll(c)Ll and mlh(c)Lh, and the consumption levels



























2     lhemc2i
The lower c, the larger the numbers of segments (mll(c) and mlh(c)) and consumers (mll(c)Ll and
mlh(c)Lh) a rm serves, and the larger the output sold and the revenue earned at any given distance
from its core segments (for m  mll(c) and m  mlh(c)). Firms with lower core marginal cost thus
serve a larger number of segments and sell larger amounts of their variants at any given distance from
the core. However, only rms whose core marginal cost is low enough are able to serve all consumers
in all markets. Moreover, according to (23), trade costs create a wedge in the penetration of domestic
and export markets. In particular, mhh(c) mlh(c) = ln ( lh) = reveals that the number of segments
covered (and thus the number of customers served) is larger in the domestic than in the foreign
markets. The more so, the higher the trade barriers (the larger  lh) and the lower the heterogeneity
in consumerstastes (the smaller ).
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Due to free entry, expected prots of entrants have to be zero in equilibrium, which imposes a free






























clh    lhemc
2
dm
are a rms total domestic and export prots as obtained aggregating across the segments it serves.








l = 1; :::; J: (27)
where lh   klh < 1 is a measure of the freenessof trade from country l to country h that varies
inversely with the trade costs  lh.
The free entry conditions (27) yield a system of J equations that can be solved for the J equilibrium











where jPj is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix
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and jClhj is the cofactor of its lh element. Expression (28) shows that, as in the closed economy,
domestic cuto¤s are determined by local market size: all the rest given, competition is tougher in
a larger market. However, cross-country di¤erences in cuto¤s now arise also from di¤erences inPJ
l=1 jClhj = jPj, which is a measure of geographical remoteness: all the rest given, central countries
exhibit tougher competition.34
As in the closed economy, (21) can be used to relate the core marginal cost cuto¤ with the mass
of variants sold in each segment in country h:
Nh =





34When trade costs are prohibitively large, (28) boils down to the closed economy result (13).
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Then, given a positive mass of entrants NE;l in country l, there will be G(clh)NE;l rms exporting on
average  variants to each segment of country h. Summing over all these variants (including those







which provides a system of J linear equations that, using Cramers rule, can be solved for the number
of entrants in the J countries:35
NE;l =








As in the closed economy, the cuto¤ level completely summarizes the distribution of prices as well as
all the other performance measures. The cuto¤ in each country also uniquely determines its welfare
through a relationship that is the same as in the closed economy (see (20)). Central countries beneting
from a large local market have lower cuto¤s and thus higher welfare than peripheral countries with a
small local market.
4.2 Bilateral Export Patterns
We have now completely characterized the multi-country open economy equilibrium. Selection op-
erates at many di¤erent margins: a subset of rms survive in each country, and a smaller subset of
those export to any given destination. Within a rm, there is an endogenous selection of customers
dictated by the number of segments served. The rm serves the largest set of segments in its domestic
market, while it reaches only a subset of those in each export market.
Putting together all the di¤erent margins of trade, we can use our model to generate predictions
for aggregate bilateral exports. If its variant m is indeed exported from country l to country h, an
exporter with core marginal cost c generates export sales of that variant equal to (25). Aggregate













lh  Lh 
(chh)
2
2 (k + 2)
(31)
where NE;l (chh=cM )
k
lh is the number of sellers from l to h (rm extensive margin), Lh is the
number of consumers who buy ls products in h (buyer extensive margin), and (chh)
2
= [2 (k + 2)]
is average sales per seller-buyer pair (rm/buyer intensive margin). Note that, in contrast with
our empirical ndings, the buyer extensive margin is not a¤ected by country characteristics such
as the trade costs and the size of the export market. The reason is that, under (2), there are two
e¤ects that exactly o¤set each other. As the size of the destination market decreases (Lh falls) or
its distance increases (lh falls), the foreign market penetration of all exporters with marginal cost c
in the interval chhe = lh < c  chh= lh shrinks. By itself this e¤ect would reduce average foreign
market penetration. At the same time, however, tougher competition also forces some exporters out
35The result exploits the properties that relate the freeness matrix P and its transpose in terms of determinants and
cofactors.
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of the foreign market altogether. As these are the exporters with marginal cost c > chh= lh that
already had the smallest foreign market penetration to start with, by itself their exit would increase
average foreign market penetration. Once more, the fact that these two opposing e¤ects exactly
compensate each other is a specic implication of the assumed distribution (2). We do not emphasize
this exact result, but rather the presence of opposing forces generating the relationship between trade
costs, market size and average market penetration. No change in the average number of segments a
rm covers then implies that in a larger foreign market rms serve, on average, a larger number of
consumers.
Thus, (31) implies that our model predicts that aggregate bilateral exports follow a standard
gravity specication based on country xed e¤ects (separate xed e¤ects for the exporter and importer)
and a bilateral term that captures the e¤ects of all bilateral barriers/enhancers to trade. This is the
type of specication we have estimated in the empirical section. Yet, it does not represent a prediction
that is unique to our model. Indeed, as shown by Head and Mayer (2013), such type of structural
gravity specication is generated by a large set of di¤erent modeling frameworks.
4.3 ExportersBuyer Mix
We now turn to some additional predictions of our model that are also consistent with our empirical
ndings but other modeling frameworks have a harder time reproducing. Specically, in the closed
economy we have described how rms respond to tougher competition in a larger market by skewing
their sales towards their core customers. We have also analyzed how this buyer mix response raises
rm productivity. We now show how di¤erences in competition across export market destinations due
to di¤erent market size and remoteness induce exporters to those markets to respond in very similar
ways: when exporting to markets with tougher competition, exporters skew their exports towards
their core customers.
In so doing, we proceed in a similar way as we did for the closed economy by examining a given
rms ratio of exports of two variants m and m0, where m0 is closer to the rms core segment. Using
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> 1 (32)
Tougher competition in an export market (lower chh) increases this ratio, which captures how rms
skew their exports toward their core variants. The intuition behind this result is very similar to the one
we described for the closed economy. Tougher competition in a market increases the price elasticity
of demand for all variants exported to that market. As in the closed economy, this skews relative
demand and relative export sales towards the variants closer to the core segment. It also increases






chh +  lhe
m0c
chh +  lhemc
< 1
Hence, when chh falls, domestic rms with chhe  < c  chh and exporters with chhe = lh < c  chh
cover fewer segments with a larger fraction of sales concentrated in their core segment and a wider
price dispersion across the segments they serve. Domestic rms with c  chhe  and exporters with
c  chhe = lh still cover all segments but also in their case a larger fraction of sales is concentrated
in their core segment with a wider price dispersion across the segments they serve.
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Finally, as was the case for the closed economy, the skewing of a rms buyer mix towards core
variants also entails increases in rm productivity. Empirically, we cannot separately measure a rms
productivity with respect to its production for each export market. However, we can follow Mayer at al.
(2011) and theoretically dene such a productivity measure in an analogous way to (c)  Q(c)=C(c)
for the closed economy as lh(c)  Qlh(c)=Clh(c), where Qlh(c) are the total units of output that rm
c exports to h, and Clh(c) are the total labor costs incurred by rm c to produce those units.This
export market-specic productivity measure (as well as the associated measure R;lh(c) based on
deated sales) increases when chh decreases, thus implying that changes in the exported buyer mix
may have important implications for rm productivity.
5 Multi-Product Model in Open Economy
Our data show that tougher competition skews a given rms sales towards its core buyers and increases
the dispersion of prices across all buyers. The model so far assumes that rms and products coincide,
so that it does not account for the empirical ndings when the product dimension is considered. This
requires its extension to a multi-product environment where each rm can o¤er several products and
variants of these products to the various market segments.
In allowing rms to handle a portfolio of products, we build on Mayer at al. (2011). Entry still
requires a rm to incur a sunk startup cost f and subsequent production exhibits constant returns
to scale but, after sinking f , the rm may now decide to produce more than one product. The
rm has, however, one core productcorresponding to its core competencyassociated with its core
marginal cost c. When a rm introduces additional products, each of them requires an additional
customization cost because it pulls the rm away from its core competency. Accordingly, supplying
a non-core product to a non-core segment incurs both a customization cost(because the product is
non-core) and an adaptation cost(because the segment is non-core).
We index by n the countable products produced by a rm in increasing order of distance from
its core competency n = 0 (the rms core product). We then denote vm(n; c) the marginal cost for
product n that a rm with core marginal cost c sells to a segment at distance m from its core segment.
We assume vm(n; c) = ! nvm(0; c) = ! nemc with ! 2 (0; 1). Note that, whereas m is a continuous
variable, n is instead a discrete variable so as to remove cannibalization e¤ects.36 This denes a
rm-level competence ladderwith increasing customization and adaptation costs, which nests the
cases of: multi-buyer single-product rms as in the previous section when ! goes to 0; single-buyer
multi-product rms as in Mayer et al. (2011) when  goes to 0; single-buyer single-product rms as
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) when both ! and  go to zero.
The absence of cannibalization implies that the multi-product extension alters only the free entry
condition (26) since now the sunk cost f allows for the supply of several products. As Nl denotes
the measure of products sold in country l, the price threshold for positive demand in that country
still satises (21) with marginal cost cuto¤s for positive domestic and export sales equal to cll = pl
and clh = ph= lh = ch= lh respectively. Accordingly, country ls rms sell domestically products with
marginal cost vm(n; c)  cll and export to country h those with marginal cost vm(n; c)  clh.
Extending (22) implies that the corresponding prots evaluate to










chh    lh! nemc
2
36For a study of cannibalization e¤ects in a demand system similar to ours see Dhingra (2012). The implications of
abstracting from those e¤ects are also discussed in Mayer et al. (2011).
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The free entry condition (26) then has to hold provided total prots from domestic and export sales













In these expressions mll(n; c) and mlh(n; c) are the measures (numbers) of variants of product n that
a producer in l with core marginal cost c sells in countries l and h respectively:
mll(n; c) =








for cll!ne  < c  cll!n
0 for c > cll!n
mlh(n; c) =
8<: 1 for c  clh!







for chh!ne = lh < c  chh!n
0 for c > chh!n
These are positive provided that the product can be sold at least in the core segment. Nll(c) and
Nlh(c) are, instead, the (discrete) numbers of products a producer in l with core marginal cost c sells
in countries l and h:
Nll(c) =

0 if c > cll,
max fn j c  cll!ng+ 1 if c  cll,
Nlh(c) =

0 if c > clh,
max fn j c  clh!ng+ 1 if c  clh.
These are positive provided that at least the core product is supplied at least to the core segment.
Note that a lower cuto¤ in a market makes all rms (weakly) reduce the numbers of segments and
products supplied in that market.

























1  !k 1 > 1 is an index of multi-product exibility increasing in ! that in equilibrium
determines one-to-one the average number of products rms supply. All the rest given, higher multi-
product exibility (larger 
) leads to a larger number of products per rm and tougher competition
(lower chh).
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Whereas the total number of products sold in each segment of country h is still given by (29), the











Once more, the domestic cuto¤ marginal cost chh completely summarizes the distribution of prices as
well as all the other performance measures and uniquely determines welfare through the relationship
(20).
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lh is the number of products exported from l to h (product extensive mar-
gin), Lh is again the number of consumers who buy ls products in h (buyer extensive margin),
and (chh)
2
= [2 (k + 2)] is average sales per product-buyer pair (product/buyer intensive margin).
We now show that multi-product rms respond to tougher competition by skewing the sales of
each product towards their core customers. The quantity of its product n a producer in country l
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The rms output and revenue ratios of exports of two variants m and m0 (with m0 < m) of product
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As long as m0 is closer to the rms core segment, tougher competition in the export market (lower
chh) increases both the output and the revenue ratios: the rm skews its exports toward the variant
of its product closer to the core due to a larger increase in the price elasticity of demand for that










chh +  lh! nemc
< 1
falls. Hence, when chh falls, the rm concentrates a larger fraction of the sales of its product in its
segments closer to the core with a wider price dispersion across all segments. This is consistent with
our regression results at the rm-product-destination level (see Tables 9-11).
Finally, the skewing of a rms product mix towards core products and variants also leads to higher
rm productivity as measured by the ratio of the total units of exported output or sales in a given
destination market to the total labor cost of producing those units. These export market-specic
productivity measures increase with the toughness of competition in that export market.
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6 Conclusion
We have used unique rm-level export datasets from three countries, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and
Uruguay, to all destinations around the world over the period 2005-2008 to present an in-depth char-
acterization of rmsexport margins, across products, destination countries, and fundamentally their
buyers. Our analysis has highlighted the relevance of the buyer margins for aggregate exports and
has provided new insights on their composition. While most exporters sell abroad only few products
to few buyers in few destinations, the few rms that export several products to several destinations
and, on top, to several buyers account for large shares of total exports. A rms (rm-products)
number of buyers and average exports per buyer increase with the size and the accessibility of the
destination country. Conditional on the number of buyers, the concentration of rm (rm-product)
export sales behaves in a similar way. We have also investigated the behavior of prices. In the same
destination di¤erent buyers pay di¤erent prices to the same rm for the same product. Buyers that
account for larger shares of a rms sales of a given product tend to be charged a lower prices for
that product. Price dispersion is a¤ected by country characteristics: it is higher in bigger and more
accessible destinations.
We have then proposed a model that generates predictions consistent with our empirical ndings
and we have used it to reveal that adjustments along the buyer margins can be an additional channel
through which trade can lead to welfare gains. In so doing, we have developed a simple model of
selection with heterogeneous buyers and sellers, merging the representative consumer approachto
product di¤erentiation that is standard in international trade theory with the address (or charac-
teristics) approach that is more popular in industrial organization. In our model the intensity of
competition a¤ects the number and market shares of active rms as well as the number of their prod-
ucts, the number of the variants of these products and the distribution of sales across these variants.
Importantly, and consistent with the evidence reported above, it also a¤ects the numbers of their
customers as well as the distributions of sales and prices across them. This last feature is the main
innovation of the model. Tougher competition allows for a better alignment between ideal variants of
consumers and core Competencies of rms, generating an additional channel through which tougher
competition leads to higher productivity and higher welfare. This points to an additional source of
gains from trade provided that freer trade leads to ercer competition.
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Aggregate Export Indicators 
2005-2008 
Costa Rica 









2005 5,794 2667 138 3,737 13,257 
2006 6,960 2808 133 4,039 14,387 
2007 8,276 2896 150 4,253 15,020 
2008 8,678 2753 143 4,117 14,705 
Ecuador 









2005 9,265 2223 127 2,238 8,769 
2006 12,400 3052 143 2,579 11,311 
2007 12,817 3370 147 3,081 11,782 
2008 19,494 3962 151 3,086 12,243 
Uruguay 









2005 3,420 1940 140 2,873 11,034 
2006 3,984 1997 149 2,874 11,829 
2007 4,515 2088 154 2,872 12,071 
2008 5,969 2130 160 3,039 11,959 





Decomposition of Aggregate Bilateral Exports 
  2005 2005-2008 
  All Countries 
  NF NP NB IM NF NP NB IM 
Total Exports 0.436*** 0.442*** 0.482*** 0.466*** 0.156*** 0.138*** 0.159*** 0.787*** 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Country Pair Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 403 403 403 403 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 
  Costa Rica 
  NF NP NB IM NF NP NB IM 
Total Exports 0.439*** 0.473*** 0.478*** 0.445*** 0.195*** 0.154*** 0.160*** 0.746*** 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.048) (0.045) (0.037) (0.056) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Country Pair Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137 137 137 137 560 560 560 560 
  Ecuador 
  NF NP NB IM NF NP NB IM 
Total Exports 0.385*** 0.361*** 0.422*** 0.549*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.111*** 0.846*** 
  (0.042) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.033) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Country Pair Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 126 126 126 126 564 564 564 564 
  Uruguay 
  NF NP NB IM NF NP NB IM 
Total Exports 0.550*** 0.565*** 0.625*** 0.322*** 0.214*** 0.177*** 0.267*** 0.712*** 
  (0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.030) (0.023) (0.029) (0.024) (0.028) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Country Pair Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 140 140 140 140 602 602 602 602 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The table reports estimates of the equations: (1) ݈݊ܯ௖ௗ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݈݊ܺ௖ௗ ൅ ߛ௖ ൅ ߝ௖ௗ for a given year (here 2005) and (2) ݈݊ܯ௖ௗ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݈݊ ௖ܺௗ ൅ ߜ௖ௗ ൅
߬௧ ൅ ߤ௖ௗ௧ for the entire sample period (2005-2008), where M corresponds to the following export margins: the number of exporting firms (NF), the 
number of exported products (NP), the number of buyers (NB), and average exports per exporting firm, product and buyer that actually register 
trade (IM). Figures do not add up to one along the rows because we present the contribution of the actual intensive margin (IM) instead of the 
theoretical intensive margin, i.e., average exports per exporter, product, and buyer, where the denominator is the set of all their potential 
combinations; ߛ௖ is a set of exporting country fixed effects, ߜ௖ௗ is a set of country-pair fixed effects, and ߬௧ denotes year fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are reported below the estimated coefficients in the left panel (2005) and standard errors clustered by country-pair are reported below the 













Response of Aggregate Bilateral Exports and Their Margins to Trade Enhancers/Barriers 
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008 
  X NF NP NB IM X NF NP NB IM 
Distance -1.945*** -1.294*** -1.510*** -1.339*** -0.311*** -2.241*** -1.342*** -1.492*** -1.432*** -0.553*** 
(0.129) (0.068) (0.075) (0.079) (0.055) (0.126) (0.054) (0.063) (0.060) (0.081) 
GDP 1.140*** 0.630*** 0.625*** 0.696*** 0.381*** 1.094*** 0.572*** 0.563*** 0.646*** 0.398*** 
(0.030) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.034) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) 
GDP per capita 0.272*** 0.219*** 0.212*** 0.198*** 0.038 
(0.065) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.046) 
Common Language 0.217 0.382*** 0.681*** 0.389*** -0.299*** 
(0.155) (0.070) (0.087) (0.073) (0.116) 
Colony 1.147*** 1.060*** 0.847*** 1.105*** -0.051 
(0.175) (0.077) (0.089) (0.084) (0.128) 
RTA -0.186 0.123 0.114 0.245** -0.397** 
(0.223) (0.101) (0.106) (0.105) (0.167) 
Country-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.561 0.697 0.677 0.681 0.221 0.602 0.765 0.748 0.757 0.231 
Observations 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The table reports estimates of the responses of aggregate bilateral exports and their various margin to trade enhancers/barriers based on two alternative 
specifications of the gravity equation: 
 ݈݊ܺ௖ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߩ௖௧ ൅ ߥ௖ௗ௧ ݈݊ܺ௖ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܩܦܲ݌ܿௗ௧ ൅ ߚସܥ݋݉݉݋݊	ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௖ௗ ൅ ߚହܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௖ௗ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܶܣ௖ௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௖௧ ൅ ߥ௖ௗ௧ 
where the dependent variable ܺ௖ௗ௧ is aggregate bilateral exports from country c to country d in year t or alternatively the number of exporting firms (NF), the 
number of exported products (NP), the number of buyers (NB), and the actual intensive margin (IM); ߛ௖௧ is a set of exporting country-year fixed effect; and ߥ௖௧.is 
the error term. The definition and source of the explanatory variables are as follows:  
GDP: GDP PPP in common currency and constant prices, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Distance: Distance between the countries’ capital cities, from CEPII. 
GDPpc: GDP PPP per capita in common currency and constant prices from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Common Language: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if more than 9% of the population of both countries speaks the same official language, from CEPII. 
Colony: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if countries had a colonial relationship in the past, from CEPII. 
RTA: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if trading countries have a trade agreement, from CEPII and WTO. 
















Distribution of Outcomes across Exporters 
2005 
Costa Rica 
  10 25 50 75 90 Average 
Total Exports 1.20 5.55 34.55 321.52 2155.41 2172.65 
Number of Buyers 1.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 14.00 6.89 
Number of Destinations 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.00 2.91 
Number of Products 1.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 14.00 5.89 
Number of Buyers per Destination 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.81 
Number of Buyers per Product 1.00 1.00 1.17 2.33 4.50 2.34 
Average Exports per Buyer 0.90 3.39 13.77 67.66 283.63 169.73 
Average Exports per Destination 1.01 4.17 19.28 121.91 559.64 346.34 
Average Exports per Product 0.63 2.61 12.55 85.07 490.87 276.57 
Average Exports per Destination, Product and Buyer 0.55 2.15 8.23 38.41 170.37 92.15 
Ecuador 
  10 25 50 75 90 Average 
Total Exports 0.00 2.60 27.90 259.17 2758.71 4167.96 
Number of Buyers 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 12.00 4.85 
Number of Destinations 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 2.25 
Number of Products 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 7.00 3.24 
Number of Buyers per Destination 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.71 
Number of Buyers per Product 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 2.52 
Average Exports per Buyer 0.00 2.30 17.14 81.75 337.87 353.56 
Average Exports per Destination 0.00 2.50 23.24 141.22 758.23 777.02 
Average Exports per Product 0.00 1.50 15.24 126.03 917.76 1987.56 
Average Exports per Destination, Product and Buyer 0.00 1.36 11.73 60.00 233.01 288.86 
Uruguay 
  10 25 50 75 90 Average 
Total Exports 1.49 4.88 27.68 242.53 1763.42 1762.67 
Number of Buyers 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 13.00 6.91 
Number of Destinations 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 7.00 2.89 
Number of Products 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 10.00 4.39 
Number of Buyers per Destination 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.56 3.00 1.60 
Number of Buyers per Product 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.35 2.18 
Average Exports per Buyer 1.38 4.00 16.07 60.24 228.83 138.15 
Average Exports per Destination 1.41 4.20 19.24 101.07 494.51 264.67 
Average Exports per Product 0.86 2.95 14.04 87.51 464.58 308.24 
Average Exports per Destination, Product and Buyer 0.79 2.56 10.62 42.43 157.81 99.04 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 

















Decomposition of Firm-Destination Exports 
  2005 2005-2008 
  All Countries 
  NP NB IM NP NB IM 
Total Exports 0.092*** 0.122*** 0.836*** 0.144*** 0.146*** 0.773*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Firm-Destination Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,281 18,281 18,281 84,887 84,887 84,887 
  Costa Rica 
  NP NB IM NP NB IM 
Total Exports 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.797*** 0.150*** 0.119*** 0.792*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Firm-Destination Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,745 7,745 7,745 33,383 33,383 33,383 
  Ecuador 
  NP NB IM NP NB IM 
Total Exports 0.046*** 0.087*** 0.892*** 0.114*** 0.147*** 0.790*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Firm-Destination Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,949 4,949 4,949 27,615 27,615 27,615 
  Uruguay 
  NP NB IM NP NB IM 
Total Exports 0.123*** 0.185*** 0.777*** 0.173*** 0.208*** 0.703*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Firm-Destination Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,587 5,587 5,587 23,889 23,889 23,889 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The table reports estimates of the equations: (1) ݈݊ܯ௙௖ௗ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݈݊ ௙ܺ௖ௗ ൅ ߛ௙௖ ൅ ߝ௙௖ௗ for a given year (here 2005) and (2) 
݈݊ܯ௙௖ௗ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݈݊ ௙ܺ௖ௗ௧ ൅ ߜ௙௖ௗ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߤ௙௖ௗ௧ for the entire sample period (2005-2008), where M corresponds to the following 
export margins: the number of exported products (NP), the number of buyers (NB), and average exports per product and 
buyer that actually register trade (IM). Figures do not add up to one along the rows because we present the contribution of 
the actual intensive margin (IM) instead of the theoretical intensive margin, i.e., average exports per product and buyer, 
where the denominator is the set of all their potential combinations; ߛ௙௖  is a set of exporting firm (from a given country) 
fixed effects, ߜ௙௖ௗ is a set of exporting firm (-country)–destination fixed effects, and ߬௧ denotes year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are reported below the estimated coefficients in the left panel (2005) and standard errors clustered by firm-














Response of Firm-Destination Exports, their Margins, and Sales’ Concentration to Trade Enhancers/Barriers 
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008 
  X NP NB IM SMB X NP NB IM SMB 
Distance -0.469*** -0.202*** -0.191*** -0.185*** -0.010*** -0.487*** -0.206*** -0.218*** -0.185*** -0.011*** 
(0.052) (0.017) (0.018) (0.030) (0.002) (0.081) (0.029) (0.028) (0.044) (0.003) 
GDP 0.265*** 0.074*** 0.120*** 0.134*** 0.007*** 0.243*** 0.068*** 0.114*** 0.119*** 0.004*** 
(0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.025) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.001) 
GDP per capita  -0.000 -0.002 -0.013 0.017 0.008*** 
 (0.045) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.002) 
Common Language  -0.209** -0.052 -0.119*** -0.103 -0.016*** 
 (0.086) (0.035) (0.030) (0.069) (0.006) 
Colony  0.335*** 0.166*** 0.203*** 0.082 0.002 
 (0.097) (0.037) (0.044) (0.076) (0.006) 
RTA  0.259** 0.093** 0.069 0.144** 0.014* 
 (0.125) (0.041) (0.044) (0.071) (0.007) 
Firm-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.706 0.618 0.454 0.758 0.793 0.707 0.621 0.460 0.758 0.793 
Observations 81,531 81,531 81,531 81,531 81,531 79,644 79,644 79,644 79,644 79,644 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The table reports estimates of the responses of firm-destination exports and their various margin to trade enhancers/barriers based on two alternative 
specifications of the gravity equation: 
 ݈݊ ௙ܺ௖ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖ௗ௧ 
݈݊ ௙ܺ௖ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܩܦܲ݌ܿௗ௧ ൅ ߚସܥ݋݉݉݋݊	ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௖ௗ ൅ ߚହܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௖ௗ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܶܣ௖ௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖ௗ௧ 
where the dependent variable ௙ܺ௖ௗ௧ is exports from firm f in country c to country d in year t or alternatively the number of exported products (NP), the 
number of buyers (NB), the actual intensive margin (IM), and the share of the main buyer (SMB); ߛ௙௖௧ is a set of firm (-exporting country)-year fixed effect; 
and ߥ௙௖ௗ௧.is the error term The definition and source of the explanatory variables are as follows:  
GDP: GDP PPP in common currency and constant prices, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Distance: Distance between the countries’ capital cities, from CEPII. 
GDPpc: GDP PPP per capita in common currency and constant prices from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Common Language: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if more than 9% of the population of both countries speaks the same official language, from 
CEPII. 
Colony: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if countries had a colonial relationship in the past, from CEPII. 
RTA: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if trading countries have a trade agreement, from CEPII and WTO. 
All regression involving SMB include the (natural logarithm of the) number of buyers as a control variable. 




















Decomposition of Firm-Product-Destination Exports 
  2005 2005-2008 
  All Countries 
  NB X/NB UV Q/NB NB X/NB UV Q/NB 
Total Exports 0.074*** 0.926*** 0.011*** 0.915*** 0.108*** 0.892*** 0.158*** 0.734*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) 
Firm-Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Firm-Product-Destination Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,956 52,956 52,956 52,956 259,131 259,131 259,131 259,131 
  Costa Rica 
  NB X/NB UV Q/NB NB X/NB UV Q/NB 
Total Exports 0.069*** 0.931*** 0.037*** 0.894*** 0.080*** 0.920*** 0.223*** 0.698*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) 
Firm-Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Firm-Product-Destination Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,596 26,596 26,596 26,596 119,523 119,523 119,523 119,523 
  Ecuador 
  NB X/NB UV Q/NB NB X/NB UV Q/NB 
Total Exports 0.070*** 0.930*** 0.141*** 0.790*** 0.124*** 0.876*** 0.091*** 0.784*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) 
Firm-Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Firm-Product-Destination Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,829 10,829 10,829 10,829 74,267 74,267 74,267 74,267 
  Uruguay 
  NB X/NB UV Q/NB NB X/NB UV Q/NB 
Total Exports 0.094*** 0.906*** -0.177*** 1.083*** 0.171*** 0.829*** 0.046*** 0.783*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) 
Firm-Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Firm-Product-Destination Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,531 15,531 15,531 15,531 65,341 65,341 65,341 65,341 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The table reports decomposition of firm-product-destination exports in their various margins. By definition, firms’ exports of a given product to a given country 
are the product of the number of buyers (NB) and average exports per buyer (X/NB), which in turn can be decomposed in average unit values (UV) and average 
quantity (weight) per buyer (Q/NB). Hence, exports of product p from firm f in country c to country d in year t can be expressed as follows: ݈݊ ௙ܺ௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ݈݊ ௙ܰ௖௣ௗ௧஻ ൅
݈݊ ൬௑೑೎೛೏೟ே೑೛೎೏೟ಳ ൰, with ݈݊ ൬
௑೑೎೛೏೟
ே೑೎೛೏೟ಳ
൰ ൌ ݈ܷ݊ ௙ܸ௖௣ௗ௧ ൅ ݈݊ ൬ொ೑೛೎೏೟ே೑೎೛೏೟ಳ ൰. Regressions of the right-hand side variables on the left-hand side variable thus additively decompose firm-
product-destination exports into the extensive margins (number of buyers) and the intensive margin (average exports per buyer). In particular, we estimate the 
following equations: (1) ݈݊ܯ௙௖௣ௗ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݈݊ ௙ܺ௖௣ௗ ൅ ߛ௙௖௣ ൅ ߝ௙௖௣ௗ for a given year (here 2005) and (2) ݈݊ܯ௙௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݈݊ ௙ܺ௖௣ௗ௧ ൅ ߜ௙௖ௗ௣ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߤ௙௖௣ௗ௧ for the entire 
sample period (2005-2008), where M corresponds to the export margins identified above, ߛ௙௖௣ is a set of exporting firm (from a given country)-product fixed 
effects, ߜ௙௖௣ௗ is a set of exporting firm (-country)product-destination fixed effects, and ߬௧ denotes year fixed effects.. Robust standard errors are reported below 
the estimated coefficients in the left panel (2005) and standard errors clustered by firm-product-destination are reported below the estimated coefficients in the 













Response of Firm-Product-Destination Exports and their Margins to Trade Enhancers/Barriers 
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008 
  X NB X/NB UV Q/NB X NB X/NB UV Q/NB 
Distance -0.358*** -0.142*** -0.216*** 0.022*** -0.237*** -0.315*** -0.142*** -0.174*** 0.021*** -0.194*** 
(0.056) (0.018) (0.041) (0.006) (0.038) (0.065) (0.022) (0.047) (0.007) (0.045) 
GDP 0.235*** 0.081*** 0.153*** 0.001 0.153*** 0.240*** 0.080*** 0.160*** -0.006** 0.166*** 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.022) (0.010) (0.016) (0.003) (0.016) 
GDP per capita   -0.042 -0.019 -0.022 0.031*** -0.053 
  (0.041) (0.014) (0.033) (0.007) (0.033) 
Common Language   0.036 -0.041 0.078 0.014 0.064 
  (0.068) (0.029) (0.057) (0.017) (0.055) 
Colony   0.049 0.113*** -0.063 -0.006 -0.058 
  (0.099) (0.043) (0.078) (0.022) (0.078) 
RTA   0.135 0.055 0.080 0.010 0.070 
  (0.100) (0.034) (0.070) (0.015) (0.070) 
Firm-Product-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.873 0.567 0.883 0.922 0.961 0.872 0.569 0.882 0.921 0.961 
Observations 248,583 248,583 248,583 248,583 248,583 242,738 242,738 242,738 242,738 242,738 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The table reports estimates of the responses of firm-product-destination exports and their various margin to trade enhancers/barriers based on two alternative 
specifications of the gravity equation: 
 ݈݊ ௙ܺ௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
݈݊ ௙ܺ௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܩܦܲ݌ܿௗ௧ ൅ ߚସܥ݋݉݉݋݊	ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௖ௗ ൅ ߚହܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௖ௗ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܶܣ௖ௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
where the dependent variable ௙ܺ௖௣ௗ௧ is exports of product p from firm f in country c to country d in year t or alternatively, their margins: the number of buyers 
(NB) and average exports per buyer (X/NB) as well as average unit value (UV) and average quantity (weight) per buyer (Q/NB); ߛ௙௖௣௧ is a set of firm (-exporting 
country)-product-year fixed effect; and ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧.is the error term The definition and source of the explanatory variables are as follows:  
GDP: GDP PPP in common currency and constant prices, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Distance: Distance between the countries’ capital cities, from CEPII. 
GDPpc: GDP PPP per capita in common currency and constant prices from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Common Language: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if more than 9% of the population of both countries speaks the same official language, from CEPII. 
Colony: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if countries had a colonial relationship in the past, from CEPII. 
RTA: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if trading countries have a trade agreement, from CEPII and WTO. 





















Response of the Concentration of Sales across Buyers to Trade Enhancers/Barriers and Toughness of Competition 
Measure of Sales' Concentration: Share of the Main Buyer 
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008 
  All Products Differentiated Products 
Distance -0.008*** -0.009***   -0.006** -0.007*   
(0.002) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.004)   
GDP 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP per capita  0.004  0.005**  0.003  0.004 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Common Language  -0.011***    -0.010**   
 (0.004)    (0.004)   
Colony  0.000    0.005   
 (0.005)    (0.005)   
RTA  0.007    0.006   
 (0.006)    (0.007)   
Number of Exporters   0.009*** 0.009***   0.007*** 0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Freeness of Trade   0.001** 0.002***   0.001 0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm-Product-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.856 0.856 0.857 0.857 0.848 0.847 0.848 0.848 
Observations 248,583 242,738 233,175 233,175 168,069 163,545 156,899 156,899 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The table reports estimates of the responses of the share of the main buyer to trade enhancers/barriers and the toughness of 
competition for both all products and differentiated products and based on the following alternative specifications: 
 ݈݊ܵܯܤ௙௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
݈݊ܵܯܤ௙௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚସ݈݊ܩܦܲ݌ܿௗ௧ ൅ ߚହܥ݋݉݉݋݊	ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௖ௗ ൅ ߚ଺ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௖ௗ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܶܣ௖ௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
݈݊ܵܯܤ௙௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ௖ܰௗ௧ிି௙ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܨ ௖ܶௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
݈݊ܵܯܤ௙௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ௖ܰௗ௧ிି௙ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܨ ௖ܶௗ௧ ൅ ߚସ݈݊ܩܦܲ݌ܿௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
where the dependent variable ܵܯܤ௙௖௣ௗ௧ is the share of the main buyer in sales of product p from firm f in country c to country d in 
year t; ߛ௙௖௣௧ is a set of firm (-exporting country)-product-year fixed effect; and ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧.is the error term The definition and source of 
the explanatory variables are as follows:  
GDP: GDP PPP in common currency and constant prices, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Distance: Distance between the countries’ capital cities, from CEPII. 
GDPpc: GDP PPP per capita in common currency and constant prices from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Common Language: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if more than 9% of the population of both countries speaks the same 
official language, from CEPII. 
Colony: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if countries had a colonial relationship in the past, from CEPII. 
RTA: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if trading countries have a trade agreement, from CEPII and WTO. 
ܰிି௙ : Number of other firms from the three sample countries exporting the same HS-2 product to the same destination in the same 
year as a proxy of toughness of competition, from our dataset. 
FT: HS2-country level freeness of trade indicator computed from gravity equation estimates (see Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano, 
2011). 
All regression include the (natural logarithm of the) number of buyers as a control variable. 













Response of the Concentration of Sales across Buyers to Trade Enhancers/Barriers and Toughness of Competition 
Alternative Measures of Sales' Concentration 
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008 
All Products 
  B1/BL HI TI CV B1/BL HI TI CV 
Distance -0.319*** -0.011** -0.126*** -0.062***     
(0.079) (0.004) (0.035) (0.017)     
GDP 0.315*** 0.005*** 0.096*** 0.044*** 0.087*** 0.002 0.055*** 0.025*** 
(0.030) (0.001) (0.015) (0.007) (0.017) (0.001) (0.016) (0.008) 
GDP per capita 0.025 0.005* 0.017 0.012 0.070** 0.006** 0.040 0.024 
(0.046) (0.003) (0.033) (0.016) (0.035) (0.002) (0.032) (0.016) 
Common Language 0.036 -0.012*** 0.004 -0.013     
(0.101) (0.005) (0.064) (0.033)     
Colony 0.019 -0.000 0.011 0.017     
(0.128) (0.006) (0.114) (0.057)     
RTA 0.203* 0.009 -0.095 -0.041     
(0.120) (0.008) (0.067) (0.031)     
Number of Exporters     0.200*** 0.012*** 0.088*** 0.045*** 
    (0.042) (0.003) (0.025) (0.012) 
Freeness of Trade     0.030*** 0.002*** 0.024** 0.012** 
    (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.005) 
Firm-Product-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.678 0.901 0.698 0.687 0.765 0.902 0.706 0.695 
Observations 54,504 242,738 54,064 54,069 52,589 233,175 52,165 52,170 
Differentiated Products 
  B1/BL HI TI CV B1/BL HI TI CV 
Distance -0.321*** -0.009* -0.101** -0.049**     
(0.095) (0.005) (0.041) (0.021)     
GDP 0.364*** 0.006*** 0.089*** 0.041*** 0.120*** 0.003*** 0.052*** 0.024** 
(0.037) (0.001) (0.017) (0.008) (0.025) (0.001) (0.019) (0.010) 
GDP per capita -0.033 0.004 0.013 0.011 0.038 0.005* 0.042 0.026 
(0.056) (0.004) (0.039) (0.020) (0.043) (0.003) (0.036) (0.018) 
Common Language 0.116 -0.010** -0.013 -0.019     
(0.119) (0.005) (0.075) (0.037)     
Colony -0.207 0.004 0.165 0.091     
(0.147) (0.007) (0.142) (0.070)     
RTA 0.273 0.008 -0.067 -0.027     
(0.169) (0.010) (0.061) (0.029)     
Number of Exporters     0.182*** 0.009*** 0.070** 0.037** 
    (0.049) (0.003) (0.029) (0.015) 
Freeness of Trade     0.020 0.002* 0.021* 0.010* 
    (0.013) (0.001) (0.011) (0.006) 
Firm-Product-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.681 0.894 0.718 0.707 0.777 0.894 0.730 0.720 
Observations 32,121 163,545 31,852 31,854 30,687 156,899 30,431 30,433 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The table reports estimates of the responses of alternative measures of sales’ concentration across buyers within given firm-product-destinations 
to trade enhancers/barriers and the toughness of competition for both all products and differentiated products and based on the following 
alternative specifications: 
݈݊ܵܥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚସ݈݊ܩܦܲ݌ܿௗ௧ ൅ ߚହܥ݋݉݉݋݊	ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௖ௗ ൅ ߚ଺ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௖ௗ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܶܣ௖ௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
݈݊ܵܥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ௖ܰௗ௧ிି௙ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܨ ௖ܶௗ௧ ൅ ߚସ݈݊ܩܦܲ݌ܿௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
where the dependent variable ܵܥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ is one of the following measures of concentration of sales of product p from firm f in country c to country d 
in year t across their buyers: the ratio of the sales to the main buyer to the sales to the least important buyer (B1/BL), the Herfindahl Index (HI), 
the Theil Index (TI), and the coefficient variation; ߛ௙௖௣௧ is a set of firm (-exporting country)-product-year fixed effect; and ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧.is the error term 
The definition and source of the explanatory variables are as follows:  
GDP: GDP PPP in common currency and constant prices, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Distance: Distance between the countries’ capital cities, from CEPII. 
GDPpc: GDP PPP per capita in common currency and constant prices from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Common Language: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if more than 9% of the population of both countries speaks the same official 
language, from CEPII. 
Colony: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if countries had a colonial relationship in the past, from CEPII. 
RTA: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if trading countries have a trade agreement, from CEPII and WTO. 
ܰிି௙: Number of other firms from the three sample countries exporting the same HS-2 product to the same destination in the same year as a 
proxy of toughness of competition, from our dataset. 
FT: HS2-country level freeness of trade indicator computed from gravity equation estimates (see Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano, 2011). 
Regressions involving HI, TI, and CV include the (natural logarithm of the) number of buyers as a control variable. 




Response of Price Dispersion to Trade Enhancers/Barriers and Toughness of Competition 
Alternative Measures of Price Dispersion 
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008 
All Products 
  PM-Pm CV SD PM-Pm CV SD 
Distance -0.054* -0.147*** -0.126***    
(0.029) (0.023) (0.028)    
GDP 0.078*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.042*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) 
GDP per capita 0.037 0.039 0.085** 0.019 0.091*** 0.047* 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.033) (0.021) (0.032) (0.026) 
Common Language 0.030 0.003 0.006    
(0.052) (0.058) (0.064)    
Colony 0.083 0.100 0.119    
(0.066) (0.076) (0.083)    
RTA 0.145* 0.044 0.097*    
(0.074) (0.042) (0.055)    
Number of Exporters    0.133*** 0.122*** 0.114*** 
   (0.031) (0.023) (0.024) 
Freeness of Trade    0.021*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
   (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Firm-Product-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.775 0.779 0.913 0.786 0.916 0.786 
Observations 54,504 53,445 53,445 52,589 51,567 51,567 
Differentiated Products 
  PM-Pm CV SD PM-Pm CV SD 
Distance -0.088** -0.139*** -0.126***    
(0.040) (0.028) (0.035)    
GDP 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.062*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
GDP per capita 0.029 0.004 0.043 0.017 0.046 0.014 
(0.030) (0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.024) 
Common Language 0.079 0.041 0.058    
(0.064) (0.063) (0.070)    
Colony 0.027 0.009 -0.032    
(0.082) (0.081) (0.083)    
RTA 0.164* 0.061 0.121*    
(0.091) (0.050) (0.068)    
Number of Exporters    0.171*** 0.125*** 0.105*** 
   (0.038) (0.028) (0.028) 
Freeness of Trade    0.030*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 
   (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
Firm-Product-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.763 0.767 0.916 0.776 0.919 0.775 
Observations 32,121 31,719 31,719 30,687 30,305 30,305 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The table reports estimates of the responses of alternative measures of price dispersion within given firm-product-destinations to 
trade enhancers/barriers and the toughness of competition for both all products and differentiated products and based on the 
following alternative specifications: 
݈݊ܲܦ௙௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܦ௖ௗ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚସ݈݊ܩܦܲ݌ܿௗ௧ ൅ ߚହܥ݋݉݉݋݊	ܮܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௖ௗ ൅ ߚ଺ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௖ௗ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܶܣ௖ௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
݈݊ܲܦ௙௖௣ௗ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܩܦ ௗܲ௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ௖ܰௗ௧ிି௙ ൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܨ ௖ܶௗ௧ ൅ ߚସ݈݊ܩܦܲ݌ܿௗ௧ ൅ ߩ௙௖௣௧ ൅ ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧ 
where the dependent variable ܲܦ௙௖௣ௗ௧ is one of the following measures of dispersion of prices of product p sold by firm f in country 
c to country d in year t across their buyers: the ratio of the maximum to the minimum price, the coefficient of variation, and the 
standard deviation; ߛ௙௖௣௧ is a set of firm (-exporting country)-product-year fixed effect; and ߥ௙௖௣ௗ௧.is the error term The definition 
and source of the explanatory variables are as follows:  
GDP: GDP PPP in common currency and constant prices, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Distance: Distance between the countries’ capital cities, from CEPII. 
GDPpc: GDP PPP per capita in common currency and constant prices from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Common Language: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if more than 9% of the population of both countries speaks the same 
official language, from CEPII. 
Colony: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if countries had a colonial relationship in the past, from CEPII. 
RTA: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if trading countries have a trade agreement, from CEPII and WTO. 
ܰிି௙: Number of other firms from the three sample countries exporting the same HS-2 product to the same destination in the same 
year as a proxy of toughness of competition, from our dataset. 
FT: HS2-country level freeness of trade indicator computed from gravity equation estimates (see Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano, 
2011). 




Aggregate Bilateral Exports, Number of Exporters, Numbers of Products, Number of Buyers, Intensive Margin, 
and Destination Size 
All Countries, 2005 
 




















































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The figures are scatterplots showing the relationship between aggregate bilateral exports, the number of exporting firms, the 
number of products, and the number of buyers, and the size the destination’s market as proxied by its GDP. All variables are 
expressed in natural logarithms. GDP is PPP expressed in common currency and constant prices. Data come from the World Bank’s 




Cumulative Distribution of the Number of Buyers and the Share of the Main Buyer and  
the Respective Kernel Estimates at Different Levels of Aggregation 


































Distribution of Exporters and Exports across Number of Buyers per Product and Destinations 







































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
Bars corresponding to the two extremes groups are highlighted in red. B stands for number of buyers, D denotes number of 
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Firm-Destination Exports, Number of Buyers, Average Exports per Buyer, and Destination Size 
All Countries, 2005 
 

































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The figures are scatterplots showing the relationship between average total firm-destination exports, average number of buyers 
across firms in given destinations, and average exports per buyer across firms in given destinations, and the size this destination’s 













Distribution of Sales and Price Dispersion across Buyers at the Firm-Product-Destination Level 
All Countries, 2005 
 





















































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The figures are kernel density estimates showing the distribution of the share of the main buyer and the standard deviation of the 
unit values across buyers for: (1) all firm-product-destinations; (2) only those firms’ exports to a destination consisting of both 
differentiated and non-differentiated products; (3) only those firms’ exports to buyers in given destinations consisting of both 





Share of Main Buyer and Price Dispersion at the Firm-Product-Destination Level and Destination Size 
All Countries, 2005 
































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA. 
The figures are scatterplots showing the relationship between the average share of the main buyer and the average coefficient of 
variation of prices across firm-products in given destinations, and the size this destination’s market as proxied by its GDP. In the left 
panel all destinations are considered. Each destination is weighted by the number of firm-product combinations with positive trade. In 
the right panel only destinations with more than 10 firm-product combinations with positive trade are considered. All variables are 
expressed in natural logarithms. In the case of the share of the main buyer, we account for the number of buyers (i.e., we present the 
residual of a regression of the share of the main buyer on the number of buyers). GDP is expressed in common currency and constant 









Characteristics Space of a Product 













Cumulative Distribution of the Number of Buyers and the Share of the Main Buyer and  
the Respective Kernel Estimates by Country, 2005 
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